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Abstract
California is implementing the most comprehensive global warming
regulatory program in the United States. A key part of this program is its
cap-and-trade system. Integral to the cap-and-trade requirements are
provisions for offsets, whereby companies, to meet their caps, can purchase
credits from certain unregulated entities whose activities are deemed to
have resulted in real and additional emission reductions. California has
attempted to avoid the Kyoto Protocol’s project-by-project lengthy and
problematic review of offsets with a performance standard approach for
domestic offsets and a sector approach for international offsets. Offsets,
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even if done right, raise serious environmental justice questions as to who
will benefit and who will be harmed as offsets are granted. California’s
approach, however, also raises questions about how real these offsets will
be, which has already lead to litigation. International offsets are even more
troublesome. California needs to reconsider its approach and further limit
the availability of these offsets if the program is to have integrity, achieve its
goals and avoid environmental justice concerns.

I.

Introduction

California is implementing the most comprehensive global warming
regulatory regime in the United States, the California Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006, commonly known by its bill name, AB 32.1 The
program’s short-term goal is to return California’s greenhouse gas emissions
to 1990 levels by 2020.
A noteworthy and key part of this regime is its precedent setting capand-trade system.2 Like most carbon cap-and-trade systems, California
provides for the creation of offsets by third parties that can be sold to
capped facilities to use in lieu of required emission reductions or expensive
allowances obtained at auction from the government or by purchase from
other capped sources. If those offsets are real, they can enhance regulation
by encouraging emission reductions from unregulated activities and reduce
costs to regulated businesses. If they are unreal, they can undermine the
entire program by blocking actual emission reductions.
California has a two-prong approach to offsets.
Domestically,
California allows offsets category by category using performance standards
to determine if offsets are real. Internationally, California relies upon other
countries to execute a geographical sector approach if California determines
these other countries have sufficient systems in place to assure the offsets
are reliable.
The biggest danger to cap-and-trade programs has been the ease with
which the rules can be gamed. The original cap is set too high, delaying
emission reductions for years. Or a glut of tradable permits, sometimes
called credits or allowances, produce the appearance of compliance without
any actual reductions. Or available phantom offsets cause the price of
carbon to plummet, defeating the fundamental goal of cap-and-trade to put

1.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (Deering 2013).

2. The author uses the phrase “cap-and-trade” because the ARB describes its
program as cap-and-trade. As discussed below, the ARB’s trading program
incorporates offsets, making it technically a “hybrid” cap-and-offset program. See
DAVID M. DRIESEN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGRAMATIC APPROACH, 310
2nd Edition, 2011.
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a price on carbon and promote innovation and produce real pollution
reductions.
California believes it has avoided these problems. However, the
California offset game has just officially begun with cap-and-trade effective
January 1, 2012. One lawsuit has already been filed challenging the legality
of the offset program, and its ultimate fate now rests with a California Court
of Appeal. Meanwhile, California is establishing linkages with provinces of
other countries, beginning with Quebec, extending its offset program
internationally. Whether the rules are fair and effective is very much in play.

II. California’s Global Warming Solutions Act
California’s cap-and-trade program is actually a small part of a larger
regulatory initiative to address climate change. California’s AB 32 program
is a collection of policies with one single goal, the reduction of California’s
emissions to its 1990 levels of emissions.3 The lead agency is the California
Air Resources Board (“ARB”).4 The ARB estimated that achieving emission
reductions to 1990 levels would mean a 30% reduction from what would
have been business as usual in 2020, a 15% reduction from 2008 levels.5
However, achieving 1990 levels does not necessarily mean that the
actual emissions in California alone will be at 1990 levels in 2020. Emission
reductions outside of California will count towards the 1990 goal if they
meet the program’s offset requirements that are more fully discussed below.
Having at least this 1990-related target, the California initiative has
encompassed a variety of programs. These programs created by statute
were gathered into a “Scoping Plan”, adopted in late 2008, to assure the
meeting of the emissions limit in a manner that achieves “the maximum
technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions.”6 The Legislature
provided ARB a wide berth of discretion in picking emissions reduction
tools:
The plan shall identify and make recommendations on direct
emission
reduction
measures,
alternative
compliance
mechanisms, market-based compliance mechanisms, and
potential monetary and nonmonetary incentives for sources and
categories of sources that the state board finds are necessary or
desirable to facilitate the achievement of the maximum feasible

3.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (Deering 2013).

4.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38510 (Deering 2013).

5. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN ES-1 (2008)
[hereinafter SCOPING PLAN], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/docum
ent/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf.
6.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561 (Deering 2013).
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and cost-effective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by
2020.7
ARB then had full authority to “adopt rules and regulations in an open
public process to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and costeffective greenhouse gas emission reductions from sources or categories of
sources, subject to the criteria and schedules set forth in this part.”8 The
regulations were to be adopted by January 1, 2011, for implementation
beginning January 1, 2012.9
ARB’s authority was constrained by nine policy considerations “to the
extent feasible.”10 These considerations in general implemented a number
of the legislature’s concerns that the program: (a) be consistent with
environmental justice (e.g., “do not disproportionately impact low-income
communities”11); (b) minimize costs and maximize benefits (e.g., “consider
cost-effectiveness”12); and (c) be effective in achieving greenhouse gas
reductions (e.g., “minimize leakage”13).
In the 2008 Scoping Plan, the largest single category of reductions was
originally to come solely from the cap-and trade program, around 34.4
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2E), almost 20% of
the 174 MMTCO2E sought to reach 1990 levels.14 That figure has more
recently been adjusted to about 18 MMTCO2E, about 10% of the needed
reductions.15
As a result, the largest reductions now are from automobile
requirements, 31.7 MMTCO2E, about 18% of the needed reductions. AB
42823 (2002) required the so-called Pavley standard,16 which the Obama

7.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(b) (Deering 2013).

8.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560 (Deering 2013).

9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(a) (Deering 2013). Cap-and-trade
technically started in 2012 but the compliance obligations actually commenced in
2013.
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (May 24, 2013), available at http://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/implementation/faq_5_24_2013.pdf.
10.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b) (Deering 2013).

11.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (Deering 2013).

12.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(5) (Deering 2013).

13.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(8) (Deering 2013).

14.

SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 17, Table 2.

15. See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE AB 32 SCOPING
PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT 12, TABLE 1.2-3 (2011), available at http://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/final_supplement_to_sp_fed.pdf.
16.
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administration affirmed upon taking office,17 contain some trading elements,
but is primarily a command and control program intended to reduce
through greenhouse gases, engine design, and automobile pollution
controls.
The next largest category is energy efficiency measures, at 26.3
MMTCO2E. Appliance efficiency, solar water heating and cogeneration are
included in this category. It represents around 15% of the goal.
The third largest category is the Renewable Portfolio Standard,
accounting for 21.3 MMTCO2E. This program now requires investor owned
utilities to derive 33% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020.18
Already, California’s utilities have reached or will soon reach 20%.19 This
represents about 12% of the goal.
The fourth category is “High Global Warming Potential Gas Measures.”
Directed at refrigerant gases, these represent 20.2 MMTCO2E, over 11% of
the emission reductions necessary to reach 1990 levels.
Now fifth are the additional reductions required for capped industries
that must come through the cap-and-trade program. While the Scoping Plan
estimated that 85% of emission sources were covered by the cap, as
indicated above only 10% of the emission reductions were anticipated to
come from the cap-and-trade mechanism alone.
The sixth largest category is the low carbon fuel standard. This
standard again contains some trading elements, but is primarily a command
and control program. Anticipated to produce 15 MMTCO2E of reduction, it
represents almost 9% of the program.
Thus, cap-and-trade is projected as a relatively small part of what
remains primarily a command and control program. Yet it has become the
high-profile element of the program, and its most controversial one. There
are many reasons for the focus on cap-and-trade, and these reasons make it
important that the program work correctly for the entire regulatory initiative
to succeed.
First, California’s program represents the United States’ most
comprehensive20 venture into cap-and-trade for greenhouse gases and
therefore could be the model for future regulation. Prior to this program,

17. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 74 Fed.
Reg. 129, 32744 (2009).
18.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 (Deering 2013).

19. See CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD
QUARTERLY REPORT 3 AND 4 QUARTER 2012 3 (2013), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/4F902F57-78BA-4A5F-BDFA-C9CAF48A2500/0/2012_Q3_Q4RPSReportFI
NAL.pdf.
RD

TH

20. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of Northeast and MidAtlantic States is the first market-based greenhouse gas regulatory program but is
limited to the power industry. See http://www.rggi.org (last visited on Oct. 9, 2013).
113
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the United States’ record was one of playing with the concept and then
backing off. First there were the negotiations over the 1998 Kyoto Protocol
that set forth the international carbon control and trading regime,21 where
the United States advocated for cap-and-trade and then refused to sign the
treaty.22 Later, in 2009, the House of Representatives, while still in
Democratic hands during the first years of the Obama administration,
passed the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill only to watch it die in the
Senate.23
Now California is implementing its program. As stated by an
economist with the Environmental Defense Fund, the organization that
coined the phrase “cap-and-trade”24:
California’s law is one of the largest and boldest efforts to limit
emissions on the planet. Until now, in the U.S. a carbon law has
been hypothetical, theoretical. California has an opportunity to
show that this works in practice. It can work as a lab for the rest
of the country.25
Secondly, cap-and-trade has become an ideological target and rallying
cry. Cap-and-trade, as eventually implemented in the federal Acid Rain

21. See Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol],
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
22. See CHRIS WOLD, MELISSA POWERS & DAVID HUNTERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
LAW 197-200, 205 (Question 3) (2009).
23. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(passed by the House July 7, 2009); See Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax With Reinvestment
Trumps Cap-And-Trade, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 586 (Spring 2013).
24. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has been credited with actually
coining the term “Cap-And-Trade.” See Elizabeth Dickinson, Capping It Off, How a
Concept Became an Environmental Policy Catchphrase, FOREIGN POL’Y (March/April 2010),
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/capping_it_off.
The
intellectual roots of trading can actually be traced back to Thomas Crocker, a Ph.D.
candidate at the time who was inspired by a paper by R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and early efforts by EPA staffers exploring market
incentives and eventually the incorporation of offsets into the Clean Air Act. Id.;
Andrews Restuccia, Newly Released Paper Details Origins of Cap-and-Trade, WASHINGTON
INDEP. (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://washingtonindependent.com/102119/
inventor-of-cap-and-trade-thinks-its-the-wrong-approach-to-climate-change.
25. Coral Davenport, California’s New Cap-and-Trade Law: A Model for the Country?,
NAT’L J. (May 30, 2013) (quoting Nathaniel Keohane), available at http://www.nationaljo
urnal.com/magazine/california-s-new-cap-and-trade-law-a-model-for-the-country-0121213.
114
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Program,26 originated with the mainstream Environmental Defense Fund
collaborating with a Republican administration.27 It has since become
identified with the carbon tax as it indirectly prices carbon based upon the
cost of allowances, and it is still a Washington imposition of pollution
controls in a manner that triggers Tea Party outrage.28 At the same time,
environmental justice activists see cap-and-trade as an extension of the pay
to pollute principle with an added twist that those suffering will be
concentrated in minority or low-income communities.29 This politicization
affects California’s program, because if indeed its cap-and-trade program
amounts to merely a carbon tax, with little trading and innovation among
capped industries, or its gains come at the expense of low-income
communities or communities of color, it could discredit the program for
years to come.
The third reason the program is important is its practical relationship
to the rest of California’s regulatory regime. Emission reductions from the
“capped” industries are expected to achieve more than two-thirds of the
reductions, 146.7 MMTCO2E. While most of these reductions are anticipated
from other measures as discussed above, if these measures fail to be fully or
partially implemented, cap-and-trade becomes an important backstop that
complements these other measures.30 Given the attack on the low carbon
fuel standard under the commerce clause in state and federal courts, that
backstop is important.31

26.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2012).

27. Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(August 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Presenceof-Mind-Blue-Sky-Thinking.html?c=y&story=fullstory.
28.

See Evan Lehmann, Ohio Conservatives See Climate Change as ‘Another Scam’,
CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059941567.
29. Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn & Shipra
Bansal, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air
Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 235 (1999) (“Pollution trading in Los
Angeles has led to concentrated toxic air emission hot-spots that have shackled lowincome and minority communities with the region’s air pollution.”).
30. SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 31 (“By setting a limit on the quantity of
greenhouse gases emitted, a well-designed cap-and-trade program will complement
other measures for entities within covered sectors.”).
31. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 WL 5227091 (9th Cir.
2013); POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Board, 2013 WL 4040057 (Cal.App. 5
Dist.). The auction mechanism is also under legal attack. See Verified Petition for
Writ of Mandate, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., (Super. Ct.
Sacramento Cnty. Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://www.calchamber.com/Government
Relations/Documents/SIGNED_Petition_11-13-12.pdf. Related subsequent litigation
115
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Full-blown cap-and-trade, as originally suggested by Ackerman and
Stewart in “Reforming Environmental Law,”32 was seen as a program
involving “tradable permits.” As Tyler McNish points out, “The early capand-trade programs did not have offset programs comparable to those used
by carbon cap-and-trade programs . . . .”33 Indeed, the most successful capand-trade program, the federal Acid Rain program, “did not use offsets.”34
The idea was that the “government establishes a cap on the total
emissions of a certain pollutant from a set of regulated sources over a fixed
compliance period.”35 Pollution sources would have a declining cap on their
emissions, but were free to meet that cap by reducing their emissions in any
manner they wished, or to buy tradable permits to pollute (now known as
credits or allowances) from similarly capped sources who had reduced their
emissions below their cap. As Ackerman and Stewart put it:
Our basic reform would respond to these deficiencies by allowing
polluters to buy and sell each other’s permits—thereby creating
a powerful financial incentive for those who can clean up most
cheaply to sell their permits to those whose treatment costs are
highest.36

is discussed by Professor Ann Carlson in California Sued Again Over Cap-and-Trade
Program, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 16, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/04/16/
california-sued-again-over-cap-and-trade-program.
32. Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV 1333 (1985). David Dreisen draws an intellectual history of the “tradable
permits” idea back to an essay by Canadian economist J. H. Dales, POLLUTION
PROPERTY AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND ECONOMICS (1968), in Capping
Carbon, 40 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L. JOURNAL 1, 11 n.47 (2010), available at
http://www.lclark.edu/live/
files/3590-401driesen.html.
33. Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets Are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights
Revolution, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 398 (2012). See David Dreisen, supra note 32, at
3 n.3 (“A pure cap-and-trade program only allows facilities with capped emissions to
purchase credits from other facilities subject to caps.”).
34. THE MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR
CALIFORNIA 98 (2009) [hereinafter MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE], available at http://www.
energy.ca.gov/2007publications/ARB-1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-2007-007.PDF.
35. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade: Moving
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 398 (2009).
36.
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Ackerman and Stewart, supra note 32, at 1341.

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014

In this manner, those who could reduce most efficiently would be
rewarded for their innovation, and those who would find it most expensive
could avoid that expense by buying cheaper credits. The result would be a
flexible program that would reduce the marginal costs of emissions
reduction to the lowest possible.37 The argument by cap-and-trade
adherents is that this approach would be far superior to a command and
control program where emission reductions were prescribed by regulators,
imposed generally across the regulated community, and defined by concepts
such as a one size fits all best available control technology which might
neither be the best nor available, at least cost effectively.
Cap-and-trade seemed to be a revolutionary idea, but its execution has
been haphazard. Defining the initial cap turned out to be a hotly contested
and easily flawed process. If a cap was initially set too high, then reductions
were easily achieved but were meaningless as no real additional reductions
beyond what would have happened anyway would occur for years, such as
with the federal Acid Rain Program.38 When the cap eventually declines to a
level that requires real reductions, companies would be unprepared, and
would ask for exceptions or be opted out of the program. This appears to
have happened with the Southern California RECLAIM cap-and-trade
program.39
If the cap were not adjusted to undermine its effectiveness, companies
would lobby for free emission credits or allowances. Under the Acid Rain
program, Congress handed out allowances for early reductions, the use of
certain technologies and other measures.40 Under Kyoto, allowances were in
effect given to Eastern European countries by adjusting their base line up to
reflect what they might have produced if not under harsh Soviet control.
There were justifications offered in each case. For example, for certain Acid
Rain capped facilities, it was to make up for early adoption of controls. In
the case of Eastern Europe, the intent was not to punish the countries for
having an abnormal low level of emissions due to the constraint of the
Soviet system.41 But the end result was that in its early years a cap could be
rendered meaningless. The same kind of cap problems aggravated by the
recent recession undermined the European carbon market causing a glut in
tradable permits.42

37.

See id. at 1342.

38.

See McAllister, supra note 35, at 413.

39.

McAllister, supra note 35, at 403-406.

40.

See id. at 399-400.

41.

See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 232.

42. Ewa Krukowska, Carbon Market Glut-Fix Wins Backing in EU Parliament,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (July 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-03/carbonmarket-glut-fix-plan-wins-backing-in-european-parliament.html.
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California believes it has learned its lessons from these other
programs. This article focuses on offsets, not the California cap, so it will
assume California’s cap has been properly done. However, given how
treacherous cap setting has been, even in California with the RECLAIM
program, it is all the more reason for assuring that the offset program is
credible.
In California, the ARB established a cap reducing emissions from the
596 MMTCO2E business-as-usual scenario to 422 MMTCO2E in 2020. It
covers a broad array of state pollution sources: manufacturers producing
products such as cement, glass, paper, steel, refined petroleum43; electricity
generators or importers44; and natural gas, fuel and carbon dioxide
suppliers.45
These capped sources have an “Allowance Budget” that corresponds to
the declining cap necessary to meet 1990 emission limits.46 This budget is
being implemented in two phases, with the first compliance period affecting
electricity deliverers, and then the rest of the capped facilities in the second
compliance period.47 The first phase begins in 2012 and the second phase
begins in 2015.48 Each facility has to provide an allowance, which is equal to
one MCO2E, for each ton of its emissions.49 ARB distributes allowances for
free for each compliance period in a complicated schedule that attempts to
initially cover 90% of prior emissions, subject to various rules that may
adjust the percentage.50 For example, various industries facing a high threat
of leakage that would likely transfer their pollution out of state to avoid
penalties receive a 100% of their assigned allowances for free through 2020.51
Others receive a declining number of allowances, having to make up the rest
through purchasing allowances at a state run auction, from third parties or
through offsets.52 An auction is held quarterly for the remaining 10% of the
capped emissions to create a minimum price for carbon releases, with a

43.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(a) (2013).

44.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(b) (2013).

45.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(c)-(g) (2013).

46.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95841 (2013).

47.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95851 (2013).

48.

See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 31.

49.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(8) (2013).

50.

See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 34.

51. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95870, Table 8-1 (2013) (included are facilities
such as petroleum extraction, steel mills and paper mills).
52.
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minimum bid of $10.71 per allowance. The first few auctions have been sold
out between the minimum price and up to $14 per allowance.53
As cap-and-trade developed, a new concept was grafted on to the
original trading idea, creating a hybrid approach. Borrowing from the Clean
Air Act’s new source review offset program,54 and EPA’s use of netting or
bubbles,55 it was recognized that there might be cheaper emission reduction
measures at facilities or activities that are not covered directly by the
program and subject to a cap and whose emission reduction could be
turned into a commodity called an offset. The Kyoto Protocol, discussed
below, features an offset program, as does the European response to Kyoto,
the European Union Emission Trading System:56
Offsets play a key role in reducing the overall cost of GHG
regulations and achieving reductions in uncapped sectors. The
cost containment aspects work in two ways. First, offsets
projects, especially those involving land use activities, are often
less expensive to implement than emissions reductions by
regulated entities. Second, in a market-based program with a
strict cap on emissions, offset credits from uncapped sectors
create an option for increasing the supply of compliance
instruments.57
As will be discussed below in reference to the Kyoto Protocol version
of cap-and-trade and the California program, forestry is the most prominent
of these activities, but other examples like destruction of refrigerants that
are greenhouse gases and control of methane from various activities, but
especially in agriculture, are not allowed. If these activities were credited for
their emission reductions, and were cheaper than measures resulting in
reductions in the capped sector, then these credits could be sold to capped
sources that could then more easily and more cheaply meet their caps. This
would minimize emissions in the cheapest fashion, expand the reach of the
program into areas not subject to regulation, and drive innovation in new
areas.

53. See AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES
BOARD ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS QUARTERLY AUCTION RESULTS SUMMARY STATISTICS (2012),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm.
54.

42 U.S.C. § 7503(a), (c) (2012).

55.

See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864 n.37 (1984).

56.

See MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 34, at 103.

57. David M. Cooley, Jonas J. Monast, Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts:
NEPA, The Endangered Species Act, and Federal Climate Policy, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 377,
378-79 (Winter 2011).
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At least that was the idea. The practice has been more challenging
than expected as explained below.

III. The Kyoto Offset Problem
The world’s nations that began to work together to develop a global
regime to address climate change seized upon market mechanisms,
principally cap-and-trade, as its core strategy. At first, in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, effective in 1994,58 the
signatories including the United States only sketched the broad outlines of
what a regime should be. The program among other goals should:
(1) Achieve a “level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system”;59
(2) Over a time period slow enough “to enable economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner”;60
(3) Be “precautionary” yet “cost effective so as to ensure global benefits
at the lowest possible cost “;61
(4) “[W]ith the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990
levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide”;62
(5) The developed countries “shall take all practicable steps to
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or
access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to
other Parties, particularly developing country Parties.”63
All of these goals speak to the promise of cap-and-trade. Cap-andtrade starts with a cap that declines to a level agreed upon in advance. Yet
it does so over a period of time, allowing companies flexibility to choose
between innovation or buying credits. The goal can be a health-based
standard that is precautionary (or in California’s case, an interim step in
greenhouse gas reduction), yet with trading that allows reductions at the
marginally cheapest cost. Interim steps in the cap can be identified, such as
the 1990 level of emissions. And for our discussion, offsets can provide a
vehicle where developed countries can reduce emissions at a cheaper cost

58. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/conveng.pdf.
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Id. at art. 2.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at art. 3.

62.

Id. at art. 4.2(b).

63.

Id. at art. 4.5.
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in developing countries, thus encouraging investment and the transfer of
technology.
When the world’s nations gathered in Kyoto, Japan, to finalize a
protocol implementing the goals of the Framework Convention, the United
States was able to promote cap-and-trade, pointing to its success in
addressing Acid Rain in the United States, and its consistency with the
Framework Convention.64 As doubts were overcome, and with many nations
as it turned out fruitlessly believing cap-and-trade would be essential for
United States participation, the Kyoto Protocol eventually included cap-andtrade as its core idea with a cap that would be the equivalent of an average
5% below 1990 levels for each nation by 2012.65
Linked to this cap-and-trade program would be the idea of offsets. The
Kyoto Protocol established its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).66
Intended for developing countries, the CDM provides “certified emission
reductions” on a project-by-project basis that developed countries could use
to demonstrate compliance with their caps.
The CDM has suffered serious problems. Determining whether
emissions have actually increased is easy if you have continuous and
automatic emissions monitoring that can be verified. In a developing
country where one relies upon records that may not exist, and testing
technology that may be inadequate or fraudulent, it can be difficult if not
impossible. Assuring that any real emission reductions will continue due to
the force of law is also difficult if the country’s legal regime is weak or
vulnerable to corruption, as in Libya, Mali, or Mexico.
Beyond these challenges is the issue of what would have happened
anyway. A developing country is so-named because it is economically
underdeveloped and is hopefully making economic and social progress. In
that climate, how does one distinguish between an emission reduction that
would have happened anyway and one that is happening only or in part
because of the encouragement of the offset program and the potential to
sell a credit for a profit?
The CDM Executive Board and forty-one U.N.-chartered Designated
Operational Entities (DOEs), governmental, nonprofit, or private consultants
who review offset applications, oversaw Kyoto countries attempting to
address these issues on a project-by-project approach.67 The results have
been mixed and heavily criticized for awarding credits for projects that

64.

See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22.

65.

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3 and 17.

66.

Id. at art. 12.3.

67. Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets Are A Bridge Too Far In The Tradable Property Rights
Revolution, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 403 (2012).
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would have happened anyway.68 Perhaps to overcome these criticisms, the
CDM engages in what project proponents consider to be a too burdensome
review, greatly increasing costs for both proponent and the reviewing
agency.69 A recent review of CDM cost studies by Tyler McNish in the
Harvard Law Review found estimates that transition costs would drain from
a CDM investment anywhere from €0.04 to €16 per TCO2,70 but he argues that
the best estimate of all relevant costs is 36% is drained from a CDM
investment.71
In the first case to litigate the legality of California’s offset program,
the numbers clearly disturbed the ARB and the Judge. In that case, Citizens
Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Board,72 the Judge noted studies
suggesting the “initiation of a project costs between $80,000 and $230,000
with an annual cost of $20,000 to $35,000 in the first year and $15,000 to
$25,000 in subsequent years.”73
When it was done well, the transition costs of assuring a project would
accomplish its goals were quite significant, providing a strong disincentive
to developing an offset. However, when the review was not done well, even
more troubling is whether the offsets are “additional,” that is, would they
have occurred anyway and therefore do not really provide a “real” reduction
from what was going to happen anyway.
The CDM uses three approaches to assure offsets are real: (1) the
barrier analysis (cost, policy barriers practically prevent the project without a
CDM incentive); (2) the investment analysis (an alternative would be
cheaper); and (3) a common practice analysis (it just is not common for this
project to be done).74 These approaches are all problematic. One analysis
found that 43% of the projects reviewed did not provide or mention evidence
for the barriers, and 30% of the projects using an investment analysis had
key information lacking.75 Another survey was even more alarming:

68.

Id. at 390 n.12.

69.

See id. at 391.

70.

Id. at 411, Table 1.

71.

See id. at 414, Table 2.

72. See Citizens Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Bd., No. CGC-12519554, 2013 WL 861396 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cnty. Cal., 2013) (hereinafter
“Statement of Decision”), available at http://webaccess.sftc.org/minds_asp_pdf/Viewer/
DownLoadDocument.asp?PGCNT=0.
73.

Id. at 10.

74. Lambert Schneider, Is the CDM Fulfilling Its Environmental and Sustainable
Development Objectives? An Evaluation of the DM and Options for Improvement, ÖKO-INSTITUT 8
(Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/622/2007-162-en.pdf.
75.
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In a Delphi survey, 71% of the participants agreed with the
statement that “many CDM projects would also be implemented
without registration under the CDM” and even 86% of the
participants affirmed that “in many cases, carbon revenues are
the icing on the cake, but are not decisive for the investment
decision.”76
This kind of analysis was particularly persuasive to the Citizens Climate
Lobby Judge.77 The Judge also noted that it “can take between two and twoand-a-half years to issue the first credit after commencing a project . . . .
These bottlenecks and delays are caused by the inability of the CDM’s
administrative structure to handle the high number of proposed projects
due to the length and complexity of the administrative process, as well as
the shortage of available emission verifiers.”78

IV. California Offset Program
Unsurprisingly, California attempted to avoid the CDM offset
problems. AB 32 allows for offsets in a market-based strategy, but it does so
recognizing the potential hazards of an offset program. The statute explicitly
requires that offsets be “real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and
enforceable by the state board.”79 They also must be “in addition to any
greenhouse gas emission reduction otherwise required by law or regulation,
and any other greenhouse gas emission reduction that otherwise would
occur.”80
The Legislature also wanted to assure that market trading systems
would not exacerbate environmental justice, requiring ARB to consider local
impacts of air pollution and the potential for direct, indirect and cumulative
impacts. In particular, ARB was to avoid any increases in toxic or criteria air
pollutants in local communities.81
The Legislature’s requirements are crucial as offsets by definition
displace the emission reductions that would normally occur in the capped
industries. When the ARB adopted the Scoping Plan, it explicitly promised
Californians secondary health benefits of its program in addition to
greenhouse gas reductions:

76.

Id. at 9.

77.

Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 9-10.

78.

Id. at 10.

79.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(d)(1) (Deering 2013).

80.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(d)(2) (Deering 2013).

81.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b) (Deering 2013).
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Our analysis indicates that implementing the Scoping Plan will
result in a reduction of 15 tons per day of combustion-generated
soot (PM 2.5) and 61 tons per day of oxides of nitrogen
(precursors to smog). These reductions in harmful air pollution
would provide the following estimated health benefits in 2020,
above and beyond those projected to be achieved as a result of
California’s other existing public health protection and
improvement efforts:


An estimated 780 premature deaths statewide will be
avoided



Almost 12,000 incidences of asthma and lower
respiratory symptoms will be avoided



77,000 work loss days will be avoided.82

The ARB noted the potential problem of overusing offsets in the Scoping
Plan:
While some offsets provide benefits, allowing unlimited offsets
would reduce the amount of reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions occurring within the sectors covered by the cap-andtrade program.
This could reduce the local economic,
environmental and public health co-benefits and delay the
transition to low-carbon energy systems within the capped
sectors that will be necessary to meet our long term climate
goals.83
However, beyond the statutory concerns about market programs and
those applying to all AB 32 regulations discussed above, ARB had full
discretion in implementing its offset program. ARB defined an offset
consistent with the statute and an allowance as being “a tradable
compliance instrument issued by ARB that represents a GHG reduction or
GHG removal enhancement of one metric ton of CO2E. The GHG reduction
or GHG removal enhancement must be real, additional, quantifiable,
permanent, verifiable, and enforceable.”84
ARB’s definition of “additional”, however, opened up the door to all of
the Kyoto CDM problems with offsets. It linked an offset to a comparison to
a “conservative business-as-usual scenario”:
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SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at ES 11-12.

83.

Id. at 37.

84.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(12) (2013).
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“Additional” means, in the context of offset credits, greenhouse
gas emission reduction or removals that exceed any greenhouse
gas reduction or removals otherwise required by law, regulation
or legally binding mandate, and that exceed any greenhouse gas
reductions or removals that would otherwise occur in a
conservative business-as-usual scenario.85
Identifying a business-as-usual scenario proved with the Kyoto CDM to
be a complicated resource intensive process, prone to uncertainty and error,
if not fraud. ARB’s rather abstract definition of “Business as Usual Scenario”
hardly solved the problem:
Business-as-Usual Scenario” means the set of conditions
reasonably expected to occur within the offset project boundary
in the absence of the financial incentives provided by offset
credits, taking into account all current laws and regulations, as
well as current economic and technological trends.86
Nor did its definition of “conservative” in reference to the scenario provide
much specificity, merely requiring that the estimated greenhouse gas
reductions be “more likely than not” to be “understated”:
“Conservative” means, in the context of offsets, utilizing project
baseline assumptions, emission factors, and methodologies that
are more likely than not to understate net GHG reductions or
GHG removal enhancements for an offset project to address
uncertainties affecting the calculation or measurement of GHG
reductions or GHG removal enhancements.87
Instead, the ARB provided that it would administratively create “offset
protocols” that would provide the methodology for determining whether
emission reduction activities would qualify for offsets.88 ARB hoped to
sidestep Kyoto’s project by project issues by relying upon uniform threshold
performance standards within categories of offset projects that would
“Establish the eligibility and additionality of projects using standard criteria,
and quantify GHG reductions and GHG removal enhancements using
standardized baseline assumptions, emission factors, and monitoring

85.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(4) (2013).

86.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(34) (2013).

87.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(58) (2013).

88.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95971-95972 (2013).
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methods.”89
The
threshold performance standards would act as
nonrebuttable presumptions that the activity would be real and additional.
The ARB hoped these performance standards could shortcut project
approval, minimize the intensity of project-by-project review yet assure the
integrity of an offset award.
The ARB has now approved four protocols for separate categories of
offsets: Ozone Depleting Substances Projects; Livestock Projects; Urban
Forest Projects and U.S. Forest Projects.90 Each protocol describes offset
standards and the method of exacting the correct amount of credits. These
protocols are primarily directed towards domestic California and other
states’ activities.
ARB, however, has broader international ambitions with offsets. This
ambition is based in the Global Warming Solutions Act itself:
The state board shall consult with other states . . . and other
nations . . . to facilitate the development of integrated and costeffective regional, national, and international greenhouse gas
reduction programs.91
How these linkages were to be made to other states and nations was
left to the ARB until recently. The Legislature in 2012 provided the following
requirements:
(f)A state agency, including, but not limited to, the State Air
Resources Board, shall not link a market-based compliance
mechanism established pursuant to [California Health and Safety
Code Section 38500] with any other state, province, or country
unless the state agency notifies the Governor that the agency
intends to take such action and the Governor, acting in his or her
independent capacity, makes all of the following findings:
(1) The jurisdiction with which the state agency proposes to link
has adopted program requirements for greenhouse gas
reductions, including, but not limited to, requirements for
offsets, that are equivalent to or stricter than those required by
Division 25.5 (commencing with Section 38500) of the Health and
Safety Code.
(2) Under the proposed linkage, the State of California is able to
enforce Division 25.5 (commencing with Section 38500) of the
Health and Safety Code and related statutes, against any entity
subject to regulation under those statutes, and against any entity
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CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95972 (a)(9) (2013).

90.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95973 (a)(2)(C)(1-4) (2013).

91.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38564 (Deering 2013).
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located within the linking jurisdiction to the maximum extent
permitted under the United States and California Constitutions.
(3) The proposed linkage provides for enforcement of applicable
laws by the state agency or by the linking jurisdiction of program
requirements that are equivalent to or stricter than those
required by Division 25.5 (commencing with Section 38500) of
the Health and Safety Code.
(4) The proposed linkage and any related participation of the
State of California in Western Climate Initiative, Incorporated,
shall not impose any significant liability on the state or any state
agency for any failure associated with the linkage.
(g) The Governor shall issue findings pursuant to subdivision (f)
within 45 days of receiving a notice from a state agency, and shall
provide those findings to the Legislature. The findings shall
consider the advice of the Attorney General. The findings to be
submitted to the Legislature shall not be unreasonably withheld.
The findings shall not be subject to judicial review.92
To demonstrate that offsets would meet these requirements,
particularly the (f)(1) requirement that linked offsets be subject to
equivalent requirements as well as enforceable under (f)(2) and (f)(3), is not
an easy task. The ARB is actively considering linking to provinces in Mexico
and Brazil for forestry offsets (and has now linked with Quebec).93 The ARB,
anticipating linkages for forestry offsets from developing countries, has
adopted provisions for “sector” offsets in addition to its individual protocol
offsets.94
These offsets allow developing countries or subnational
jurisdictions within those countries to receive credits from carbon removed
or sequestered from the atmosphere by a specific sector (e.g., reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation known as REDD plans)
within a particular jurisdiction.95 The idea is that if in a large geographical
area overall degradation or deforestation is reduced with plans to assure
leakage and fraud are avoided, credits will be allowed.
ARB’s backstop for any problems with offsets is limiting the amount of
offsets that could be used for a facility’s compliance. Total offsets may be

92.

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894(f) (Deering 2013).

93. THE REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP, CALIFORNIA, ACRE AND CHIAPAS, PARTNERING
REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM TROPICAL DEFORESTATION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONSERVE
TROPICAL RAINFORESTS, PROTECT LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND REDUCE STATE-WIDE GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS 2 (Evan Johnson, eds., 2013) (July 2013) [hereinafter ROW
RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://greentechleadership.org/documents/2013/07/rowfinal-recommendations-2.pdf.

TO

94.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95991 (2013).

95.

See id.
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no more than 8% of a facility’s allowed emissions.96 Sector offsets may be
more no more than 2% of a facility’s emissions during the first two
compliance periods, and no more than 4% during the third compliance
period ending in 2020.97 Note these limits are of a facility’s total emissions,
not the amount of emissions that each facility is expected to reduce under
the program.
While this seems to be a very cautious limitation on offsets, in fact
offsets by 2020 could cover all of the expected reductions from cap-andtrade when the cap is at its most stringent, and presumably, able to achieve
the most benefits for Californians. As indicated above, in 2008, the ARB
estimated this additional reduction from cap-and-trade to account for 34
MMTCO2E by 2020.98 However, in light of the recession, and thanks to a new
environmental review required by a successful court challenge to the
environmental analysis of the Scoping Plan under the California
Environmental Quality Act, ARB now believes cap-and-trade need only
achieve 18 MMTCO2E of reduction.99
Meanwhile, ARB’s final regulations set the 2020 allowance budget at
334.2 MMTCO2E. Under the 8% offset cap described above, the total amount
of offsets that are allowed in 2020 are therefore about 27 MMTCO2E.100
Under the 4% international offset cap, half of that amount may be allocated
to international offsets, that is, about 13.5 MMTCO2E, by 2020. Thirteen and
one-half MMTCO2E of international offsets is 75% of the 18 MMTCO2E of
reductions now anticipated under cap-and-trade to come from power plants,
refineries and the other capped sources. Domestic offsets from farms,
forests, and City tree planting and other approved sources of domestic
offsets could completely eliminate any reductions from the capped sources
expected to come from cap-and-trade. In effect, offsets could be more than
the entire cap-and-trade ballgame, and if a significant number are not real,
they would jeopardize the program’s effectiveness.
The ARB has also pledged to keep offsets below 49% of all of AB32’s
reductions.101 However, given that the total reductions from capped sectors
amount is approximately 146.7 MMTCO2E,102 this provides no additional
restriction beyond what the 8% limit accomplishes.

96.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95854(b) (2013).

97.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95854(c) (2013).

98.

See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, Table 2 at 17.

99. See FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE AB 32 SCOPING PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT
DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 12, Table 1.2-3.
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See ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 18, Figure 1.5.

101.

See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 37.

102.

See id. at 21, figure 3.
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Thus, even if offsets are real and additional, which is questionable as
discussed more fully below, the contribution made by cap-and-trade to the
secondary health benefits promised in the Scoping Plan may be displaced or
eliminated. As discussed below, this use of offsets for the capped facilities
raises serious civil rights issues.

V. Offsets, Civil Rights, and Environmental Justice
To the extent cap-and-trade reductions are to come from refineries,
power plants and other industrial sources, allowing these facilities to
“offset” required emission reductions or shield emission increases of
greenhouse gases raises serious civil rights and environmental justice
concerns. As the ARB noted in the Scoping Plan, as described above, AB 32
provides significant co-benefits by reducing greenhouse gases and their copollutants at industrial facilities. Offsets by displacing these benefits have
the potential to reduce these benefits.103
Moving emission reductions from industrial to nonindustrial activities
such as forestry management are especially troublesome, as Professor Alice
Kaswan has pointed out:
For example, under an offset program, a timber company could
plant or preserve trees that would sequester carbon. The timber
company could then sell credits representing the sequestered
carbon to an industrial facility that would use them to offset its
carbon emissions. Assuming that the carbon sequestration
project had environmental integrity, the GHG emission benefits
would be the same. The co-pollutant benefits would differ,
however, because allowing facilities to use non-industrial offsets
instead of industrial allowances would result in fewer GHG and
co-pollutant emission reductions from the controlled industrial
sectors.104
The California Legislature therefore required the ARB to “[e]nsure that
activities undertaken to comply with the regulations do not
disproportionately impact low-income communities.”105 Further the Board
must “[e]nsure that activities undertaken . . . complement, and do not
interfere with, efforts to achieve and maintain federal and state ambient air
quality standards and to reduce toxic air contaminant emissions.”106

103.

See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 80-81.

104. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30
UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 51, 105 (2012).
105.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (Deering 2013).

106.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(4) (Deering 2013).
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Adversely affecting minority and low-income communities or denying them
the benefits of a program would constitute violations of federal and state
civil rights statutes.107
Consistent with these laws, AB 32 mandates benefits to disadvantaged
communities:
The state board shall ensure that the greenhouse gas emission
reduction rules, regulations, programs, mechanisms, and
incentives . . . direct public and private investment toward the
most disadvantaged communities in California and provide an
opportunity for . . . community institutions to participate in and
benefit from statewide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.108
The major stationary sources of air pollution in California are
disproportionately located in minority or poor communities.109 A recent
evaluation by the California Environmental Protection Agency using a multifactor analysis of pollution found that among the top 10% of the worst zip
codes, the percentage of Hispanics jumps from their statewide average of
37.6% to 63.8%; African Americans jump from 5.8% to 9.5%.110 Similar results
have been found on a national level.111

107. See Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); see also CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 11135 (Deering 2013) (prohibiting the state from carrying out programs that
adversely impact communities of color or low-income communities or deny them the
benefits of a program).
108.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (Deering 2013).

109. See Manuel Pastor, Rachel Morello-Frosch, James Sadd & Justin Scoggins,
Minding the Climate Gap: What’s At Stake if California’s Climate Law Isn’t Done Right and Right
Away at 3 (2010) [hereinafter What’s at Stake], available at http://dornsife.use.edu/pere/
documents/mindingthegap.pdf; See also Manuel Pastor, Jr., Rachel Morello-Frosch,
and James Sadd, Still Toxic After All These Years: Air Quality and Environmental Justice in the
San Francisco Bay Area at 2 (2007) [hereinafter Still Toxic], available at http://cjtc.
ucsc.edu/docs/bay_final.pdf.
110. Matthew Rodriguez & George V. Alexeeff, California Communities
Environmental Health Screening Tool (CalEnviroscreen 1.1), OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 118, available at http://oehha.ca.gov/ej/pdf/CalEnviroscreenVer11
report.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
111. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, REDUCING
RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 3 (1992) (“There are clear differences between racial groups
in terms of disease and death rates . . . . Racial minority and low-income populations
experience higher than average exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste
facilities, contaminated fish and agricultural pesticides in the workplace.”); for more
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Environmental Justice activists are concerned about the loss of cobenefits within a cap-and-trade system with offsets. They doubt that a
program that will facilitate payments for offsets and emission reductions
moving from industrial based communities that are disproportionately
populated by people of color to rural communities that are predominantly
white actually directs “public and private investment toward the most
disadvantaged communities in California,” as AB 32’s section 38565
requires:
Cap and Trade is an ineffective system because it does not
require major polluters to reduce their carbon emissions. Cap
and Trade allows major emitters of greenhouse gases to buy
“reductions” from other polluters instead of reducing their own
pollution. Polluters may also avoid reducing their emissions by
purchasing “offsets.” Offsets can be bought from a source nearly
anywhere in the world and go to fund ecofriendly projects. So
while trees are being planted in Canada, corporations can
continue to pollute back home in California at levels equal to or
even greater than they did before AB 32. Cap and Trade deprives
nearby residents from the benefits of toxic, smog, and particulate
matter pollution reductions that would accompany local
greenhouse gas reductions. Environmental justice communities
burdened by huge industrial concentrations of pollution would

recent data, see also Robert D. Bullard, Paul Mohai, Robin Saha & Beverly Wright, Toxic
Wastes and Race at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters After All Of These Years, 1978-2007 at 398399 (2007), available at http://www.sph.umich.edu/symposium/2010/pdf/bullard1.pdf
(“In 2000, people of color and the poor thus continue to be particularly vulnerable to
the various negative impacts of hazardous waste facilities. Moreover, the present
findings show that this is the case for African Americans, Hispanics and
Asians/Pacaific Islanders.”). Two more recent studies in 2008 and 2009 using new
EPA databases assessing risks in neighborhoods around major industrial sources
found that “African Americans and Hispanics were the first or second most pollutionburdened racial groups in more than half of the metropolitan areas studied” and
“average exposures for minorities . . . are two to three times those of whites.” David
E. Adelman, The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: Implications for Greenhouse Gas
Trading and Toxic Hotspots, 88 IND. L.J. 273, 285-286 (2013), available at http://www.
repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11041&context=ilj. According to
Adelman, both studies agreed “African Americans had a higher likelihood of being
exposed to disparate health risks from industrial air toxics and for the risks to be
greater than those of other groups.” Id. at 287.
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likely see no benefits when major polluters buy, instead of
reduce, their pollution.112
The California Legislature was especially concerned that market
mechanisms may cause environmental injustice. Thus, the legislature in AB
32 reprised its cautionary language applicable to the entire program113 when
setting out the parameters for the use of market mechanisms:
Prior to the inclusion of any market-based compliance
mechanism in the regulations . . . the state board shall do all of
the following:
(1) Consider the potential for direct, indirect, and cumulative
emission impacts from these mechanisms, including localized
impacts in communities that are already adversely impacted by
air pollution.
(2) Design any market-based compliance mechanism to prevent
any increase in the emissions of toxic air contaminants or criteria
air pollutants.114
The importance of assuring that the benefits of AB 32 are shared and
that adverse impacts, particularly to disadvantaged communities, are
avoided, is reflected in the process leading to ARB’s Scoping Plan115:
This plan reflects the input of Californians at every level. Our
partners at other State agencies, in the legislature, and at the
local government level have provided key input. We’ve met with
members of community groups to address environmental justice
issues, with representatives of California’s labor force to ensure
that good jobs accompany our transition to a clean energy future,
and with representatives of California’s small businesses to
ensure that this vital part of our state’s economic engine
flourishes under this plan. We’ve heeded the advice of public
health and environmental experts throughout the state to design
the plan so that it provides valuable co-benefits in addition to
cutting greenhouse gases. Scoping Plan, p. ES-3.

112. Eileen Gauna, Environmental Law, Civil Rights and Sustainability: Three
Frameworks for Environmental Justice, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 34, 57 n.70 (Summer,
2012) (quoting Center on Race, Poverty & Environment).
113.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38562(b)(2), 38562(b)(4) (Deering 2013).

114.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b) (Deering 2013).

115. Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scop
ing_plan.pdf.
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As concerning as these environmental justice implications are about
domestic offsets, it would be even more alarming if the offsets are not fully
real or additional. That would mean that health benefits are not merely
being relocated or redistributed in a manner that impacts certain
communities, but are actually eliminated for anyone in California. As
discussed below, environmental justice organizations, human rights
organizations, litigants in a pending lawsuit and at least one California
legislator are now raising serious questions about the effectiveness of these
domestic and international offset provisions, and their legality.

VI. Domestic Offsets Litigation
On March 27, 2012, the Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s
Earth Foundation filed a complaint in San Francisco Superior Court
challenging the offset protocols that ARB had adopted for their reliance
upon the performance standard approach to offsets.116 In this case, which
has been adjudicated in the trial court and is now on appeal at the time of
the drafting of this article, the plaintiffs contended that the performance
standard approach would not assure that the greenhouse gas reductions
signified by the offset were in fact “additional” for each offset project. The
plaintiffs argued that the ARB’s approach appears to be problematic, given
that it defined “additional” as requiring reductions beyond “any greenhouse
gas reduction or removals otherwise required by law, regulation or legally
binding mandate, and that exceed any greenhouse gas reductions or
removals that would otherwise occur in a conservative business-as-usual
scenario (emphasis added).”117
The conservative business-as-usual scenario, described previously,
already seemed to have its own problems. The purported offset reductions
would be compared to a business-as-usual scenario that only required a
“conservative” “more likely than not” assurance that emissions were
understated in the business as usual scenarios. To put it another way, if
there were a 49% chance that the business-as usual scenario was overstated,
there was a significant chance the offsets would be partially or completely
unreal, or not additional. Now, adding protocols based upon performance
standards that make broad assumptions about whether the offset activity
would occur without offset revenue would seem to only magnify the risks
with offsets.

116. See Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Found. v. Cal. Air
Res. Bd., CGC-12-519554 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cnty, Cal., March 28, 2012),
available at http://webaccess.sftc.org/minds_asp_pdf/Viewer/DownLoadDocument.asp?
PGCNT=0.
117.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(4) (2013).
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The development of the particular protocols suggests the plaintiff’s
concerns were more than theoretical. The ARB has now approved four offset
protocols.118 Each one utilizes a threshold performance standard that
assumes if an activity occurs, the activity must be in addition to the morelikely-than-not business-as-usual scenario and a result of the offset credit
incentive.
For example, the Livestock Protocol awards offsets to dairy and swine
farms for containing methane emissions from manure.119 Anaerobic
digesters trap the methane and then destroy them through flaring or
harness them to create heat and electricity.120 There was no dispute that
employing these techniques would be useful to reduce the potent
greenhouse gas methane121 from the atmosphere.
The issue, however, was whether the use of a biogas control system is
a business-as-usual practice. The trial court noted that a report to the ARB
“determined that 0.07% of all dairy farms and 0.02% of all swine farms in the
United States use anaerobic digesters to dispose of manure.”122 The ARB
then simply assumed that if a farmer were to use this technology then it
would only be due to its offset protocol and therefore be additional.
Plaintiffs pointed to a U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Report that suggested
that these digesters could be profitable:
We know that anaerobic digesters that convert animal manure
into electricity are a powerful renewable resource. One 700 head
dairy herd can power 200 homes with electricity. Yet, currently
the United States is only utilizing dairy power on 2% of the farms
that serve as candidates for profitable and sustainable sources of
energy.123

118.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95802(a)(3), (36), (60), (93); §§ 95970-97 (2013).

See AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, COMPLIANCE OFFSET
PROTOCOL LIVESTOCK PROJECTS (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/cap
andtrade10/coplivestockfin.pdf.
119.

120.

Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 12.

121. Methane is 23 times more potent than CO2 over 100 years. See CHRIS
WOLD, ET AL., supra note 22, at 7.
122. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 13. A later EPA report found that
the percentage was 1.9% of dairy and swine farms where it is technically feasible to
install them. Id.
123. Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Discusses How Obama Administration Is Partnering
With Farmers And Ranchers To Combat Climate Change, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., Dec.
15, 2009, available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=
true&contentid=2009/12/0612.xml.
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that the dairy industry had
pledged a 2% reduction in their greenhouse gases by 2020, years before
ARB’s protocol was adopted and implemented. The USDA actually already
financially supported some farms, and indeed, later the U.S. EPA and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture formed a strategic initiative to encourage
digesters.124
The ARB, nevertheless, based simply upon the fact that anaerobic
digesters were not “common practice,” determined that installation of
anaerobic digesters was a sufficient performance standard to qualify as an
offset.125 However, that surely begs the question, is a new digester a result
of the federal initiative, the dairy industry’s commitment, the particular
circumstances of a farm where converting methane may be profitable, or the
impact of the offset protocol? And if the answer is murky, would not that be
true of the validity of the offset?
A similar question arises with each of the protocols. With the Ozone
Depleting Substances Projects, the ARB staff again found that destruction of
these chemicals used in appliances or building foam or in refrigerant
equipment was not “common practice.”126 Thus, under the rule, it is
assumed that destruction of the specific chemicals regulated (those where
import or production are banned but not their use in the US under other
laws such as the Montreal Protocol) is additional. The ARB does make a
general assessment of how likely each chemical would have been released,
reducing the credit, but if it is destroyed it is entitled to an offset
notwithstanding what the particular owner or manufacturer might have done
in the absence of the offset program.127
The two forestry protocols face notable difficulty in assuring that all
reductions are beyond “any” that would result from the business-as-usual
scenario.
The Urban Forests protocol applies “tree planting and
maintenance activities in urban areas along streets, in parks, on educational

124. See EPA Administrator and Agriculture Secretary Team Up to Promote Farm Energy
Generation Agreement Will Help Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, UNITED STATES ENVTL PROT.
AGENCY, May 3, 2010, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e77fdd4
f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f/eddc8a628ce5e9b2852577180066c2d3!OpenDocument.
125. CAL. AIR RES. BD., STAFF REPORT AND COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL LIVESTOCK
MANURE (DIGESTER) PROJECTS 5 (2010).
126.

See Statement of Decision, supra at note 72, at 30.

127. See AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, STAFF REPORT AND
COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES PROJECTS 4-7 (2010),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/cappt3.pdf.
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campuses, and in utility service areas.”128 The protocol’s performance
standard is a “Net Tree Gain.”129 The ARB is assuming that any city or college
or municipality that plants more trees than die is doing so because of the
offsets. Further, it is assumed upon the entity’s agreement that this will
continue for 100 years, until annual reporting indicates otherwise. This
requirement makes sense, in that there is ultimately no gain from a tree
absorbing carbon if it is ultimately cut down and carbon is then released.
However, it also means that for ten, or twenty, or thirty years credits could
be generated that would be illusory if trees are cut down or die at any point
before one hundred years.
Utilities do not even have to show a net tree gain:
Most utilities do not have tree planting programs that go beyond
replacing trees removed during line clearance operations. While
some have programs specifically aimed at storing carbon and
conserving energy in residential households, on average utilities
are planting fewer than 400 trees annually in these types of
programs. All trees planted under these types of programs are
considered additional and therefore are designated as eligible
project trees.130
The implication in the ARB’s discussion of its utility protocol is that
some utilities already have tree-planting programs. Would other utilities
have proceeded accordingly? Do the ones that do have programs get credit
for what they are already doing, presumably so. The trial court’s decision
points to a survey of urban cities showing “that a third of surveyed cities
have a net tree loss and many others have a tiny net tree gain.”131 But what
of the other cities that experience above a minimal net gain? Is it really the
case that California’s cities have no incentives to expand the number of
trees in their cities without the offset protocol?
The last protocol is for U.S. Forest Projects addressing “forest
management activities . . . designed to increase removals of CO2 from the
atmosphere, or reduce or prevent emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere . . .

128. AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, STAFF REPORT AND COMPLIANCE
OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. URBAN FOREST PROJECTS 4 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.
gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/cappt2.pdf.
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129.

Id. at 5.

130.

Id. at 6.

131.

Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 31.
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through increasing and/or conserving forest carbon stocks.”132
For
reforestation projects, a developer “must demonstrate that the land has
been out of forest cover for 10 years.”133 Projects are assumed to continue
for 100 years, but if subsequent monitoring and reporting demonstrates a
termination of the project, at least the ARB requires that additional trees be
maintained as a buffer system of contributed or deducted credits from the
offset award that creates in effect an insurance system.134 The sufficiency of
this insurance system, that is, will enough additional trees be maintained to
counter failures in tree credits, will be unknown for decades to come.
From a policy standpoint, the performance standard approach to
offsets raises serious questions, particularly as offsets could potentially
dominate the reductions expected from cap-and-trade as discussed above.
If offsets are 25% illusory because they partially award credits for activities
that were already occurring, then that would mean that 25% of the
reductions that would have produced health co-benefits and made progress
towards greenhouse gas reduction goals would be foregone in lieu of the
offsets.
The role of a court, however, is to determine the legality of regulations
that are challenged, not necessarily their wisdom. The San Francisco trial
court’s approach and analysis is interesting, not only from a legal standpoint
but from its greenhouse gas policy standpoint.
California’s case law on administrative review of regulations is
sometimes vague. “The appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny in any
particular case is perhaps not susceptible of precise formulation, but lies
somewhere along a continuum with nonreviewability at one end and
independent judgment at the other.”135 This deference is fundamentally a
two-step process. First, in the words of a statute codifying the case law, the
regulation must be “consistent and not in conflict with the statute . . . .”136
The standard of review is normally de novo, though there are exceptions
where the courts use an arbitrary and capricious standard.137 Then in the
words of the statute, the regulation must be “reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the statute.” The test here is the arbitrary and

132. AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, STAFF REPORT AND COMPLIANCE
OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. FOREST PROJECTS 5 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/
regact/2010/capandtrade10/cappt5.pdf.
133.

Id. at 6.

134.

See id. at 8.

135.

Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1, 7 (1998).

136.

CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 11342.2 (Deering 2013).

137.

Yamaha, 19 Cal.4th at 16 (Mosk, concurring).
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capricious standard, which asks if the agency’s action was “arbitrary,
capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.”138
ARB’s discretion, as described above, is quite sweeping. The San
Francisco trial court appropriately focused upon the performance standard
approach. However, the court sliced the two-step analysis in an interesting
fashion. While some courts look at the specific regulation to determine if it
was consistent with the statute, the trial court looked at the concept of the
regulation to determine if it was consistent with the statute. The trial court
considered the content of the particular performance standard in each
protocol to be merely the exercise of ARB’s discretion, and if it were
reasonable, then it was permitted.
In theory, a performance standard is quite appealing given the
drawbacks of Kyoto’s project-by-project approach. The experience of the
Kyoto CDM process drove the ARB and later the trial court’s reasoning in
supporting the performance standard approach. Yet, the first step does not
disappear once one reviews the specific regulation. If the specific regulation
is contrary to law, it is still invalid, and that is subject to a de novo review.
For example, in the Communities for a Better Environment case,139 the court
examined a number of guidelines (deemed regulations) under the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).140 One of the regulations has to do with
“Thresholds of Significance: Use of Regulatory Standards to Determine
Significant Environmental Effect.”141 CEQA requires an environmental
impact report for a project if it “may have a significant effect on the
environment.”142 At the beginning stage of a CEQA process, the standard for
determining whether a project may have a significant effect is whether “it
can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial evidence that the project
may have significant environmental impact.”143
On the other hand, in a section that was not disputed in the
Communities for a Better Environment case, the Guidelines also allow for local
agencies to adopt “thresholds,” akin to performance standards, that
generally provide a standard for any project to determine significance, that
is, “a quantitative or qualitative standard, or set of criteria, pursuant to

138. Communities for a Better Env’t v. Cal. Res. Agency, 103 Cal.App.4th 98,
109 (2002).
139.

Id.

140. CEQA begins at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2013) [hereinafter
CEQA]; the Guidelines are at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15000 (2013) [hereinafter Guidelines].

138

141.

Guidelines, supra note 140, at § 15064(h).

142.

CEQA, supra note 140, at §§ 21151, 21100(a), 21080(d), 21082.2(a).

143.

No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 75 (1974).
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which the significance of a given environmental effect may be
determined.”144
The Court of Appeal decision had little trouble finding this Guideline
to be contrary to the statute’s insistence upon a fair argument being
sufficient to force a full environmental impact report, “regardless of whether
other substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion.”145 However,
the CBE court did so after having gone way beyond the concept of a
threshold being useful for an agency in its first appraisal, which again, no
party disputed. It considered the specific language of the regulation and
what might potentially happen if a party made a fair argument in an actual
case. “It ignores the real issue here—the application of an established
regulatory standard in a way that forecloses the consideration of any other
substantial evidence showing there may be a significant effect.”146
The trial court in the offset case addresses the idea of a performance
standard as an abstract de novo issue, and then considers the actual
protocol with the actual performance standard as an arbitrary and capricious
standard issue. This practice seems to be inconsistent with the Communities
for a Better Environment case approach. There, the appellate court delved into
the particular wording of the regulation to determine if it could be contrary
to the statute. For offsets, the San Francisco Superior Court ignored the
actual performance standard in determining statutory compliance and then
evaluated the actual protocol adopted only as to whether it was arbitrary.
As result, the trial court failed to fully grapple with the implications of
these protocols. The trial court noted that all parties agree that the statute
required that “each and every reduction must be additional.”147 The court
then states that “it is not . . . easy to precisely determine whether a
reduction is additional.”148 In fact, according to the trial court, “Determining
additionality is difficult, and it is impossible to precisely delineate between
additional and non-additional projects.” It further discusses the baseline or
business-as-usual scenario:
By including the term “more likely than” this definition admits
that GHG reductions might not be understated, that they could
be overstated or include non-additional reductions.149

144. Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency,
103 Cal.App.4th 98, 110-111 (2002).
145.

Id. at 110, 114.

146.

Id. at 114.

147.

Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 23.

148.

Id.

149.

Id. at 24.
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The court then concedes that the offset program will give credits to
actual projects that are not additional:
Petitioners attempt to show the Legislature did not intend for
Respondent to use a standards-based approach by pointing to a
handful of digesters, ODS programs, urban forest projects, and
U.S. forest projects. They contend that these few projects are
non-additional but will receive offset credits prove the failure of
Respondent’s Protocols. Whether a particular digester, ODS
program, or tree is additional has no bearing on whether the
Legislature delegated to respondent the power to use a
standards-based approach.150
The Trial Court may be right that in the abstract, the ARB can use a
standard- based approach, but if the standard allows projects that are not
additional, it would contradict the statute. As the court had previously
admitted, no one disputes that every offset project must be additional.
Once the court gets by its de novo review of performance standards in
general, it was easy for the court to sustain the protocols as not arbitrary.
For the Livestock protocol, the court found evidence supporting ARB’s
determination that the use of digesters is “above and beyond common
practice,” with one report estimating that “[s]ixty-nine anaerobic digesters,
out of the 8,000 that could be installed, would be installed without offset
credits.”151
It similarly found evidence based on a study that the destruction of
refrigerant ODS without incentive from the carbon market is not a common
market activity.152 When the petitioners asked the court to look behind the
conclusion of the study to see if they were supported by the evidence, the
court stated: “[U]nder an arbitrary and capricious standard, it is not for this
court to reweigh the evidence. When treading into the murky waters of
statistical analysis and scientific studies, the Court defers to Respondent’s
expertise, experience, and sweeping grant of law-making powers.”153
For the Urban Forest Protocol the court relied on that survey showing
only that a third of the surveyed cities have a net tree loss and many others
have a tiny net tree gain, dismissing evidence that urban tree programs were
alive and well at various cities across the country, including its home town

140

150.

Id.

151.

Id. at 13, 27.

152.

Id. at 29-30.

153.

Id. at 30.

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014

in San Francisco.154 The court noted the significance of the protocol’s
requirement that trees be maintained for 100 years—an admittedly
problematic likelihood in today’s urban world; however, the court ignored
the similar likelihood of any regulatory regime lasting 100 years in a state
that is barely more than 150 years old.155 In the end, the court hid behind
the arbitrary and capricious standard: “[a] regulation is not arbitrary or
capricious if Respondent has considered all relevant factors and
demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice
made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.”156
The court noted that the U.S. Forest Protocol was developed “in
lengthy consultations with industrial and non-industrial forest managers,
experts from California and federal forest agencies, environmental
organizations, forest landowners, and forestry scientists.”157 Again, the Court
found that the ARB had “considered all relevant factors and has
demonstrated how its choices support the purposes of the Act.”158
The Court refused to apply any higher standard of review to the
Protocols:
Any higher standard makes no practical sense as this Court
would have to quickly acquire the skill and expertise necessary to
adroitly examine the anaerobic digester market, the ODS
destruction market, the common practices of urban forest
planting, and management practices for forests across the United
States.159
The broad scope of ARB’s authority to pick and choose its strategies for
addressing climate change,160 and the trial court’s own admitted lack of
expertise clearly influenced the trial court.161

154. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s
Earth Found. v. California Air Res. Bd. (San Francisco County Superior Court, Cal.,
Case No. CGC-12-519554, October 9, 2012) at 37.
155.

See Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 30-31.

156.

Id. at 31.

157.

Id. at 32.

158.

Id. at 33.

159.

Id. at 25.

160. Id. at 23 (“The Legislature granted Respondent vast discretion to
promulgate any type of GHG reduction measure.”).
161. Id. at 30 (“When trading into the murky waters of statistical analysis and
scientific studies, the Court defers to the Respondent’s expertise, experience, and
sweeping grant of law-making powers.”).
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Pursuant to this case’s appeal, the Court of Appeal will consider
whether the trial court properly applied the standard of review for
administrative regulations. And it is, to use the ARB’s offset lexicon, more
likely than not that the trial court will be sustained, as the California
appellate courts seem unduly deferential to the ARB in carrying out this new
program. In the first case squarely addressing the implementation of AB32,
the First District Appellate Court reviewed a challenge to the Scoping Plan
because the “ARB ‘made no attempt to analyze potential disproportionate
public health impacts to communities living closest to the facilities eligible
to participate in the cap and trade system,” among other reasons.162 The
Appellate Court dismissed this concern, citing a health study of a minority
community inundated with refineries, power plants and other industrial and
commercial operations. The validity of the study, based upon facts with
conclusions supported by the evidence, was not discussed, barely assuring
the “hard look” required by federal and state courts in environmental review
cases.163
However, regardless of the ultimate decision in this case on the
offsets’ legality, from a policy perspective California will still have an offset
program that does not assure additionality and by definition, may only
provide as little as a 50.1% (more likely than not) confidence level that an
offset represents a real reduction from a true business-as-usual scenario.
This statistic remains alarming for a program that the trial court noted could
displace “85% of all potential reductions.”164
The trial court, after considering the Kyoto CDM flaws and the
uncertainty in performance standards, could only throw up its hands and
state:
[The ARB] would have to abandon any use of offsets, and
perhaps the entire cap-and-trade program, if this Court found
that the Act’s ambit was transgressed every time a credited
reduction was potentially non-additional.165
The court may be indulging in “realpolitik” decisionmaking to save capand-trade. However, if an essential part of a market is that offsets are
“additional,” California’s program may have a serious flaw. Whether that

162. Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Bd., 206
Cal.App.4th 1487, 1504 (2012).
163. E.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); Ebbetts Pass
Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 123 Cal.App.4th 1331,
1345 (2004).
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flaw will actually be exploited by offset developers remains to be seen. This
flaw may be even more important with the advent of international offsets.

VII. The International Linkage Problem
California’s desire to link its cap-and-trade program with other
countries raises additional unique issues. The issues of additionality and
permanence would play out in an arena where ARB has no authority and
minimal ability to monitor. It raises even more pronounced environmental
justice issues because at least in theory the reduction of greenhouse gases
through domestic offsets offers some potential of other co-benefits that
might reach disadvantaged communities if the wind blows the right way.
With international offsets, there is no question that offsets for activities in
another country will come at the expense of disadvantaged communities
that are disproportionately located near capped industries such as power
plants and refineries.

A. The Possible Benefits of Linkage and Offsets with Acre
and Chiapas
In describing the potential issues with international offsets, it is
important to recognize certain benefits from the proposed linkages to other
nations. Climate change is a critical global issue, as well as a national issue,
that profoundly affects disadvantaged communities. Reducing greenhouse
gas emissions anywhere is a benefit for the United States, California and all
of its communities.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Fourth
Assessment Report in 2007,166 the United States in its Global Climate
Change Impacts in the United States report,167 and the World Bank in its
Turn Down The Heat report168 have well documented what climate change
means for the world, the United States and for the State of California. The
government of California argued strenuously in successfully advocating for a
permissible waiver from the Clean Air Act’s preemption of state automobile
rules, articulating that its automobile greenhouse gas rules were particularly

166. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/
ar4_syr.pdf.
167. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/
pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf.
THE

168. THE WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT (2012), available at http://climate
change.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_cen
trigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf.
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important for California. The state cited the effect of global warming on its
coast, its snowpack in the Sierras and related water issues, and noted how
its metropolitan areas were vulnerable to climate change aggravated smog
conditions.169
The Program for Environmental and Regional Equity at USC has
further documented in its Climate Gap report170 that impacts to low-income
communities and communities of color in California from climate change
will be particularly severe. Climate change is an environmental justice issue
for local communities as it is for communities around the globe.
Deforestation in particular plays a large role in contributing to climate
change. “From 1850 to 1998, approximately one-third of man-made GHG
emissions into the atmosphere came from releases due to land-use
changes, mostly through deforestation.”171 Forested areas have decreased
20% during the past 140 years.172 The Kyoto Protocol has long recognized
that addressing deforestation may be a critical part of any strategy to
address climate change.173
Further, indigenous people have suffered dramatic injustice, especially
when it comes to the environment. Thus, indigenous people are the subject
of the United Nation’s Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.174
The island of Tuvulu175 and the Village of Kivalina176 are just two examples of
the many indigenous victims of climate change.
It has also been well documented and not necessary to repeat in depth
the role of developing nations in the battle against climate change. Their
ability to develop their nations without using the carbon energy sources that
western nations used for their development is a key problem in any climate
strategy. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent post-Kyoto meetings
have addressed the use of green funds and technology transfer to facilitate

169. See Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (July 8, 2009).
170. Rachel Morello-Frosch, Manuel Pastor, James Sadd & Seth Shonkoff, The
Climate Gap (May 2009), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/The_
Climate_Gap_Full_Report_FINAL.pdf.
171.

CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 9.

172.

CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 8 (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY at 26-27).

ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

173.

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3, para. 3.

174. UNITED NATIONS, DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2008)
available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
175. See Tuvalu and Global Warming, TUVALU ISLANDS, http://www.tuvaluislands.co
m/warming.htm (last visited July 8, 2013).
176.
144

See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
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development without carbon.177 In this regard, devising mechanisms to shift
climate change resources south to developing nations is a positive step to
take.178
Offsets in particular provide an opportunity to leverage California’s
program to achieve reductions in sectors or nations that are not currently
under the AB 32 regulatory program and have not been well served by the
Kyoto process. Advocates of this approach believe sector offsets will lead to
new programs and techniques to address greenhouse gases without difficult
to enforce mandates. The resulting innovations may then later serve as a
basis for future regulation:
[T]heir successful implementation could greatly multiply the
global impact of AB 32 by sending a signal to [countries linked to
California] that their hard work and political leadership in
mitigating climate change will be recognized and rewarded and
by providing a critical learning opportunity for other emerging
cap-and-trade programs as they consider whether to adopt
similar provisions . . . .179
California’s use of a sector approach to develop offsets to reward
efforts to reduce deforestation is intended to avoid the problems with the
Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism that focused on a project-by-project
approach. According to California’s offset regulations:
“Sector” or “Sectoral,” when used in conjunction with sectorbased crediting programs, means a group or subgroup of an
economic activity, or a group or cross-section of a group of
economic activities, within a jurisdiction.180
As explained by its advocates: “These sorts of jurisdictional programs . . .
have the potential to generate emissions reductions at much larger scale
and lower cost than the traditional project-based model.”
Further, the project approach makes “leakage,” the movement or
transfer of emission causing activities, to another off-project site inevitable
and difficult to track, and requires an extensive investigation of reference
levels or the business-as-usual scenario which, as described above, is

177.

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 10(c).

178. The Green Climate Fund was established at the Cancun meeting under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Green Climate
Fund, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/items/5869.php.
179.

ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 3.

180.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(256) (Deering 2013).
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vulnerable to miscalculation if not fraud. Sector offset advocates believe the
sector approach better avoids these issues:
By defining performance across the entire jurisdiction for the two
main types of emissions (forest conversion to lower-carbon land
uses such as crops and pasture, and forest degradation through
forest fires, logging, and other human-induced activities), risks of
performance reversal and leakage at the project level can be
absorbed into state-wide performance and accounting,
appropriately directing attention to the large-scale changes in
the rural development that are the essential foundation of
permanent emissions reductions.181
For all of these reasons, it is worthwhile to consider how a linkage that
provides offsets for California’s program from reducing deforestation in
Central and South America can be achieved in coordination with the AB 32
framework. This effort is consistent with AB 32’s requirement for exploring
linkages with other states and countries.182
The question is whether international linkages can be done credibly,
assuring that offsets are rewarded for real, additional and permanent
reductions. There are serious issues as to whether California will be able to
provide that kind of assurance.

B. The Problem with International Offsets
1. International Offsets Raise Serious Civil Rights Issues
As discussed above with domestic offsets, for every ton of an
international offset acquired by a power plant or refinery, there is one less
ton of reduction of greenhouse gas at the facility, or even worse, permission
to increase emissions by one ton, with all of the co-pollutants or co-hazards
that go along with foregone emission reductions.183 These facilities are
disproportionately located near low-income communities and communities
of color.184
Similar to domestic offsets, international offsets pose an
environmental justice and civil rights problem. Internationally, the issue is
starker, as there is no question that the reductions in emissions do not

181.

ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 4.

182.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38564 (Deering 2013).

183.

See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5 at 80-81.

184. See, e.g., What’s at Stake, supra note 109; Still Toxic, supra note 109; U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 111; Robert D. Bullard et al., supra note
111; David E. Adelman, supra note 111.
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affect California’s residents. Moving emission reductions to Brazil or
Mexico, for example, with money flowing out of California to purchase the
offsets, clearly denies communities near power plants and refineries the cobenefits and investment promised in the scoping plan.
2. International Offsets in Developing Countries Pose
Special Problems in Assuring that They Will Be Real,
Permanent, Quantifiable, Verifiable, Additional, and
Enforceable Emission Reductions
With domestic offsets, the offset developer and capped source
purchaser are within the ARB’s jurisdiction. Regulations have been adopted
that assure that if an offset is false, fails or otherwise is inadequate that the
ARB can take enforcement action.185 The ARB can rely upon existing
monitoring, inspections and other tools that an enforcement agency has
available to it.
An international offset in a developing country is inevitably dependent
upon the host country or third parties to validate the activities giving rise to
the offset. Corruption at any stage in the development of the offset, from
the initial reporting to the verification and monitoring will undermine the
offset.
Corruption is a serious problem in developing countries. A brief
review of the first two developing countries bidding to participate in the AB
32 program is a reminder of how serious this issue is. According to
Transparency International, Brazil ranks 69th in its corruption index.186
Mexico ranks 105th.187 For comparison, Canada, whose province Quebec is
the first international linkage approved under AB 32, ranks ninth,188 and the
United States ranks 19th.189
The Heritage Foundation in its 2013 Index of Economic Freedom ranks
Brazil at 100.190 Brazil’s freedom of corruption score is 38, a low score, with
the foundation stating: “Despite some progress, corruption continues to be

185.

E.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95977.1, 95983, 96014 (2013).

186. Brazil—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#BRA_DataResearch (last visited July 6, 2013).
187. Mexico—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#MEX (last visited July 6, 2013).
188. Canada—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#CAN (last visited July 6, 2013).
189. United States—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#USA_DataResearch (last visited July 6, 2013.
190. Country Rankings—2013 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking.
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pervasive.”191 Mexico’s freedom from corruption score is even worse, with a
score of 30. For comparison, the United States is ranked tenth in the world
and its freedom of corruption score is 71. Recent news articles about
Brazil’s corruption trials and potential new investigations support these
perceptions.192 Also, recent alarming stories about massive protests over
corruption in Brazil indicate the extent of Brazil’s corruption problem.193
Admittedly, there is technology today that would aid in the discovery
and avoidance of fraudulent offsets, including satellite images.194 Whatever
technology is used, however, the issue is the interpretation of data and the
problem that there may be conflicts of interests in the verification of offsets.
If the ARB is taking a passive role in assessing offsets, as suggested in its
reliance upon international forestry programs known as REDD (“Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation”) in its regulations,195
satellite images, for example, are not enough to guard against corruption
and manipulation of data: This issue is thoroughly discussed by the U4 Anti
Corruption Resource Center in its briefing paper, “Corruption and REDD+
Identifying Risks and Complexity”:
Corruption in the implementation of REDD+ is linked to fraud in
the collation and interpretation of data that will determine
financial rewards. REDD+ generates incentives for dishonest
measurements and reporting on reforestation achievements,
avoided deforestation and good forest stewardship. Funds may
be paid for projects that have not taken place, that have not been
as successful as claimed, for achievements that would have
occurred anyway (the problem of ‘additionality’), or are reversed
after payments have been made (the problem of ‘permanence’).
It is also possible that beneficiaries of REDD+ payments may
attempt to exert undue influence or offer illicit financial

191. Brazil—2013 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/brazil (last visited July 6, 2013).
192. See “Brazil prosecutors want ex-president investigated,” AP reported in
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2013, available at http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Brazilprosecutors-want-ex-president-investigated-4414812.php.
193. Simon Romero, Protests Widen as Brazilians Chide Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/americas/brazilian-leaders
-brace-for-more-protests.html?pagewanted=all.
194.

ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 42-43.

195. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95993(a) (2013) (“Sector-based credits may be
generated from . . . REDD plans.”).
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payments to agencies responsible for data production and
analysis. The profits in doing so may be substantial.196
Corruption is a difficult problem to measure because of its
pervasiveness and secrecy, and this problem is exacerbated when measured
on an international scale. For an international offset to provide some
measure of assurance, the ARB would have to be proactively involved in a
manner similar to what it does with domestic offsets. However, the ARB
does not have the international tools that the federal government has, for
example, a State Department. Even if it did, the ARB’s authority would be
limited by international law if it tried to interfere with another nation’s
sovereignty.
Beyond the issue of corruption, the technical problems of assuring
that reductions are additional and permanent are quite complex. The key to
any cap-and-trade and related offset program is that the baseline or
reference level for offsets is set to assure that any emissions reductions are
additional to what would happen without the program.
Otherwise, the program is foregoing additional reductions to what
would occur without the program, making the program irrelevant.
The main motivation in encouraging offsets in developing countries is
the enhancement of forests. The question becomes, what is the businessas-usual scenario in a situation when deforestation, the destruction of
forests, is business as usual? If a lowering of the rate of deforestation is
considered an emissions reduction, all that means is that less trees are
being cut down. This is a far cry from the ARB’s domestic Urban Forest
Protocol using a performance standard of a net gain in trees. Until there is
actually an increase in trees, the ability to remove carbon continues to
decline and yet offsets can be rewarded.
Even if one accepts the pragmatism of rewarding a declining rate of
deforestation, determining whether to award credits still requires
determining the appropriate baseline. If one bases the rate on a multiyear
analysis, then it is possible that simply maintaining the same rate of
deforestation of the prior year, if less than the multiple year period, would
lead to the award of credits. Then the question becomes, how many years
does one include in the baseline, and why was there a lower rate in the most
recent of those many years. Was it an aberration, or had conditions changed
in the forestry market or due to pests or other economic factors such that a
lower deforestation rate would have happened anyway? Soon parties will be
jockeying to adjust baselines and rate measurements to maximize the offset

196. U4 ANTI CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER, CORRUPTION AND REDD+ IDENTIFYING
RISKS AMID COMPLEXITY 2-3 (2012), available at http://www.u4.no/publications/
corruption-and-redd-identifying-risks-amid-complexity/.
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and obscure the proper baseline. To make matters worse, the ARB will have
to sort this out thousands of miles away.
The problem is not merely theoretical, as the leading province for
linkage is believed to be Acre, in Brazil. Acre has a declining yearly
deforestation rate and it will be below its 10-year average deforestation rate
even if its doubles the rate of deforestation from 2011.197 If the rate were
based upon a 3-year period, it could still merely maintain its rate of
deforestation and get credits, though far fewer. Even if the 10-year average
is a rolling average, it would be well beyond 2020 before any offsets awarded
would actually be additional.
It would seem imperative if these reductions are to be additional to
what is already occurring without AB 32 offsets that the baseline level be
adjusted to capture the decline in deforestation rates over the last 10 years
prior to the commencement of the linkage. Otherwise, Acre will have no
incentive to continue with its progress and real and verifiable emission
reductions in California will be foregone with no additional benefit in Acre,
or in similar circumstances, Chiapas.
One suggested remedy for what would be a regulatory nightmare for a
distant ARB is to rely upon third parties for regulatory oversight. The REDD
Offset Working Group (ROW), a group of state representatives and technical
experts who are developing recommendations for California, Chiapas and
Mexico for how to implement linkage, have included in their
recommendations numerous references to the use of third parties for the
most important tasks of assuring these offsets are real. “California should
recognize credits issued by Partner Jurisdictions or approved third-party
programs that meet California’s requirements.”198 “California should rely on
independent third-party certification and auditing of these programs rather
than attempting to perform its own regulatory oversight.”199
A third-party regulatory program, displacing the California Air
Resources Board’s primary role under AB 32 as the chief implementer and
regulator of the cap-and-trade program is not a trivial suggestion. How are
these third parties accountable? How are conflicts of interest avoided?
What is the role of the public in decisions made by third parties? In a
situation where corruption is commonplace and the methodological issues
are not transparent and are easily gamed, the checks and balances available
to U.S. governmental agencies to offset validation would seem to be
essential.
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VIII. Can Offsets Be Made Credible?
Regulatory programs have incorporated offsets for decades without the
issues presented in the ARB’s approach, and without the problems
documented for the Kyoto CDM process. Principally, the Federal Clean Air
Act has relied upon offsets in its New Source Review Program.200
The differences between the offsets provided in the federal Clean Air
Act and the ARB’s approach are substantial. Federal offsets are required for
new major sources of pollution in areas failing to achieve health
standards.201 The offsets must be enforceable and provide emission
reductions that are otherwise not required.202 Under the federal Clean Air
Act the offsets are approved on a project-by-project basis, either at the time
they were banked or during the permit process for a new or modified source
that seeks to use them. “Offsets are emission reductions, generally obtained
from existing sources located in the vicinity of a proposed source.”203 They
are usually regulated sources,204 subject to inspections and monitoring,
within the jurisdiction of an air pollution agency, to assure there is no fraud.
There are numerous opportunities for public involvement.205 To the extent
these sources are controlling beyond their permitted levels, there is at least
some assurance that indeed the reductions are real.206
The ARB’s offset program veers into unregulated areas and makes
short-cut assumptions as to what would be a suitable baseline. The
advantage is that areas beyond its immediate regulatory authority may
contribute to reducing global warming, hopefully at a cheaper price than
reductions at industrial sources. However, this regulatory scheme may lead

200.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a), (c) (2012).

201.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2012).

202. Natural Res. Def. Council v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 651 F.3d
1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011).
203. Nonattainment NSR Basic Information, UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/naa.html (last visited July 8, 2013).
204. See Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 108-109 (2012).
205. See What You Can Do, UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/NSR/public.html (last visited July 8, 2013).
206. Admittedly, on the state level, states have used EPA’s approval of
Economic Incentive Programs to broaden traditional offsets to incorporate various
trading schemes with traditionally unregulated activities. To the extent states have
done this, they face the same environmental justice issues as ARB’s AB 32 offsets.
See Drury et al., supra note 29; see also Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools For Environmental
Justice: Articulating A Net Health Effects Challenge To Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS
WEST NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203 (2001).
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to errors in the performance standards for specific projects or activities,
resulting in a substantial risk that some of the resulting reductions may not
be real.
If offsets are substantially unreal or not additional, it would mean that
the promised emission reductions from cap-and-trade will not occur. That
would not necessarily doom the entire AB 32 program because, as discussed
above, it is a small part of the entire program. Even then, to the extent
allowances are no longer passed out for free but must be purchased, carbon
will have a price, though with cheap unreal offsets the price will inevitably
be low. At that point cap-and-trade is functionally like a carbon tax, and like
all carbon taxes, if they are too low it will not significantly change polluter
behavior. At that point, the program will simply fund the government, who
may be selling the allowances at auctions, and the offset developers, who
may or may not be engaged in activity that is additional and beneficial.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the earlier part of this article, reducing
cap-and-trade to essentially a tax that has no real effect on greenhouse
gases will irretrievably discredit greenhouse gas regulation. And to the
extent it delays needed reductions with their health co-benefits, it raises
profound environmental justice issues. It is therefore crucial to get it right.
The discussion above suggests that the ARB might have been wiser to
limit its offset program for emission reductions from stationary sources
already regulated under state and federal air pollution laws, albeit not
included in the AB 32 cap. Overcompliance would entitle a source to
contribute an offset if it was permanent. These sources could be easily
monitored and documented.
An alternative to a complete ban of nontraditional offsets that are from
sources not regulated under state and federal air pollution laws is a far
tougher limit on how many offsets could be purchased. The ARB by
regulation has allowed offsets to potentially overwhelm all of the reductions
from cap-and-trade, as discussed above. If nontraditional offsets were
generally more limited, then the program as a whole would have credibility
and these experimental offsets would be a true pilot program, at least
through 2020. It would give the agency time to develop its expertise and
methodology without undue harm to the program. If there are concerns
about tighter offset limits leading to unduly high allowance costs, Professor
Kaswan has suggested the ARB could increase the number of allowances
available only to the extent needed to return to reasonable costs.207

207. See Alice Kaswan, Comments on Supplemental Functional Equivalent Document,
in CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, RESPONSES TO COMMENTS ON THE SUPPLEMENT TO THE
AB 32 SCOPING PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT 46-9 (2011), available at http://
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/response_to_comments_on_supplement_to_fed.pdf.
Professor Kaswan suggested in her comment limiting offsets to no more than 4%,
rather than 8% of total emissions by 2020. The ARB did not specifically respond to
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Professor David E. Adelman has suggested still another proposal to
assure that non-traditional offsets do not lead to toxic hot spots in
industrialized neighborhoods. He suggests identifying certain industrial
facilities, such as steel mills, normally located in toxic hot spots and
discounting the value of any offsets they purchase, or putting a premium on
their price, and requiring enhanced monitoring.208 The advantage of this
approach is that it does not bar offsets completely, allowing some flexibility
and cost-control; however, it creates the problem of finding the sweet spot
of the discount so that it is strong enough to limit offsets without curtailing
them completely. It would seem a firm limit on such offsets would be more
reliable than guessing at the market effect of a premium.
Even a well-regulated offset program from nonregulated sources has
the potential to cause environmental justice issues as described above. This
problem could at least be mitigated by directing that some of the proceeds
from an offset sale be directed towards the Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Fund, which based upon SB 535 (2012) has a portion targeted specifically to
disadvantaged communities.209
If the ARB wishes to explore the world of international forestry, it
cannot assign out its governmental responsibilities to third parties. It needs
to do its own evaluation of the appropriate baseline and avoid the use of
performance standards. A sector approach for international offsets might be
promising, but it needs to assess all of the circumstances including short
term and long term trends and establish sufficient agreements to allow it to
monitor and inspect as well as rely upon satellite data to understand
whether a reduction in deforestation is really something new resulting from
the prospect of being awarded an offset credit or just business as usual.210

this suggestion, just noting in general that existing permits, regulatory controls, and
enforcement actions makes adverse air pollution impacts “unlikely.” Id. at 46-39. The
author suggests focusing in on the nontraditional and international offsets and more
aggressively reducing them to perhaps 4% of the “emission reductions” anticipated in
the Scoping Plan, truly a pilot program that will not swamp the anticipated program
benefits.
208.

David E. Adelman, supra note 111.

209. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39711, 39715 (Deering 2013). California
Governor Jerry Brown, however, has “loaned” the proceeds of this fund to the state’s
general fund for non-Greenhouse Gas reduction uses, purportedly for one to two
years, suggesting that this approach has its political limits. See CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BD., CAP-AND-TRADE AUCTION PROCEEDS INVESTMENT PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 201314 THROUGH 2015-2016 1 (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capand
trade/auctionproceeds/final_investment_plan.pdf.
210. California State Senator Ricardo Lara has proposed eliminating
international offsets entirely, in a bill that is supported by the Coalition for Clean Air
and the State Building Trades Council of California and opposed by the California
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By minimizing offsets from unregulated pollution sources, abandoning
a generalized performance standard for a holistic case by case or sector by
sector approach, refusing to farm out its responsibilities to third parties and
mitigating environmental justice concerns, the ARB could salvage in
principle its greenhouse gas offset program. It could also hope that while
there are theoretical flaws that could allow the program to be gamed, that
for most offsets the performance standards will on average in practice end
up identifying real offsets in most cases. ARB seems to rely on the latter
strategy. It is effectively rolling the dice with odds only more likely than not
that it will succeed—a little better than flipping a coin and calling heads.
The test of whether the ARB’s pragmatic strategy will work will be in
the actual data from the operation of AB 32. Auction prices should rise as
free allowances are phased out and the cap decreases. If the prices do not
rise, capped companies are possibly innovating and thereby reducing their
emissions. Alternatively, an oversupply of cheaper offsets may be available.
If offsets are plentiful enough to fully meet the amount allowed under AB 32
by 2020, then possibly, they are too easy to come by. The selling price of
offsets in the period after the market settles and companies become
experienced with the program would also be a signal of the supply of offsets.
The allowance auction price, the number of offsets being created and used
and their price will be important data points to watch.211
Still, the complete answer will require a careful audit of the offsets.
Have rates of deforestation fundamentally changed in California and in
developing countries linked to the program? Are rates of destroyed
refrigerants and farm biogas digesters increasing throughout the US even for
those entities outside the program? The answers to these questions and the
relevant data points of the program will demonstrate whether the ARB has

Chamber of Commerce. See S.B 605, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at
http://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml. Also opposed by oil companies,
offset developers and environmentalists backing cap-and-trade, business analysts
confirmed the offset dependency of the California program arguing that without outof-state and international offsets the price of allowance credits could rise 200
percent, in effect admitting that cap-and-trade will not produce any significant
innovation reducing pollutants in capped industries. Rory Carroll, California Offsets Bill
to Allow Out-Of-State Credits, POINT CARBON (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.pointcarbon.
com/news/1.2514699.
211. A senior analyst at Thompson Reuters Point Carbon now predicts that
California carbon prices will be reduced by two-thirds from initial forecasts due to
reduction of emissions from other AB 32 programs and the supply of allowances and
offsets, an ominous sign. Thomson Reuters Point Carbon lowers California carbon price forecast
by two thirds, POINT CARBON (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/
pressroom/pressreleases/1.2562573.
154

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014

been wise in its approach. It will also determine who has won the offset
game and who has lost.

IX. Conclusion
Cap-and-trade’s initial promise was that two sources, under
obligations to comply with regulations, could choose the cheapest method
of reducing emissions to meet an overall cap on emissions at the least cost
via market mechanisms. By trading its right to pollute created by reducing
emissions, a source could monetize its innovation and, for a price, help
another source avoid doing more expensive reductions. California threatens
to have a cap-and-offset program, instead of cap-and-trade, with offsets that
may be illusory. On paper it may achieve its goals of reducing emissions;
but in reality, the system fails to reduce global emissions of greenhouse
gases while assuring environmental justice for all of its residents.
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* * *

156

